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Abstract 
 
The paper aims to contribute to the renaissance of a manufacturing oriented view of 
economic system. It begins by providing a critical review of the main turning points in the 
manufacturing versus services debate evaluating the analytical and empirical arguments 
deployed in favour of each view. It goes on to describe the profound transformations in 
industrial systems and the redistribution of manufacturing production across countries over 
the last two decades which challenge some of the assumptions on which the service oriented 
view is built. This section concludes by reviewing old and new rationales supporting a 
manufacturing oriented view. The second part of the paper addresses the importance of 
certain industries, including machine tools to generate industrial capabilitiy and why 
technological linkages stemming from manufacturing industries more generally are key 
enablers of a country’s systemic capacity to generate technological change. Finally the 
negative consequences of de-linking manufacturing production from services (off-shoring) 
are explored highlighting the systematic disruption of the bundle of technological linkages 
constituting the industrial commons.  
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Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the importance of manufacturing in the political economy debate 
has steadily declined. However, recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in  
manufacturing production its potential as an engine of technological dynamism and a source 
of the wealth of nations for which it was previously recognised. This has led analysts to 
identify a worldwide ‘manufacturing renaissance’ emerging in different contexts with 
multiple focuses, observable in many white papers and scientific research. In particular, 
deindustrialisation, loss of strategic manufacturing industries, increasing trade imbalances, 
decreasing technological dynamism and industrial competitiveness have been major concerns 
in advanced economies. This paper aims to contribute to the renaissance of a manufacturing 
oriented view in two ways.  
The first contribution of the paper is to provide a critical review of the main turning points in 
the manufacturing versus services debate and evaluate the analytical and empirical arguments 
supporting the two opposing views. By sketching the tensions behind the service oriented 
view that have arisen as a result of the profound transformations in industrial systems and the 
redistribution of manufacturing production across countries over the last two decades (the 
current financial crisis and resulting manufacturing loss being just the peak of these global 
trends), a systematisation of old and new rationales supporting a manufacturing oriented view 
is presented. 
Many of the rationales put forward in the current debate would have been familiar in the 
1960s and 1970s but are now supported by new empirical evidence. However detailed 
understanding of ‘how’ and ‘why’ manufacturing matters is still limited. There are two main 
reasons for this insufficiency. Firstly, without disaggregating the analysis from the macro 
level to the sub-sectors and even production activities/tasks levels, it is difficult to say 
whether certain manufacturing industries matter more than others (still less why and how). 
Secondly, without taking into account the new realities of manufacturing systems and their 
configuration in global production networks, we are not able to identify the fundamental 
channels through which certain manufacturing industries perform their ‘catalytic role’. 
Disentangling these new realities and, thus, identifying the new manufacturing oriented 
rationales, make an integration of economics, engineering and operations management 
necessary. 
The second contribution of the paper is to explore the reasons why certain manufacturing 
industries (such as the machine tools industry) are more important than others and why 
technological linkages stemming from manufacturing industries are key enablers of a 
country’s systemic capacity to generate technological change. This second issue is addressed 
by analysing the negative consequences of de-linking manufacturing production from 
services (off-shoring) which systematically disrupt the bundle of technological linkages 
constituting the industrial commons.  
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1. ‘Making’ or ‘doing’: Moving the debate forward 
Does the wealth of nations, that is, their socio-economic development and technological 
power, mainly result from superior capacities in manufacturing (i.e. making things) or in 
doing other activities (i.e. providing services)? Furthermore, do different sectors and/or 
production tasks performed within each sector contribute to economic growth in specific 
ways?  Finally, to what extent can a sustained process of economic growth rely on the 
increasing relative expansion of the service sector? 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the political economy debate addressing 
these questions has witnessed two major turning points. Until the late 1970s, the debate was 
dominated by scholars working in the classical economics tradition who supported what we 
call here a manufacturing oriented view. Then, in the subsequent two decades of the twentieth 
century (1980s – 2000) a service oriented view came to dominate and remained central to the 
academic and policy debate until the recent financial crisis. These two opposing views 
emerged in, and may partially reflect, the worldwide process of structural change and 
manufacturing development that started after the World War II. A snapshot of countries’ 
manufacturing development trajectories over the last half of the twentieth century, is essential 
to understand the context of the manufacturing versus services debate.  
 
1.1 Manufacturing development: Some long-term stylised facts 
Eighteenth-century Great Britain was the first country to experience wide ranging and 
systematic manufacturing development with consequent rises in productivity and output. In 
the nineteenth century Belgium, Switzerland and France followed by the United States began 
to industrialise. In due course latecomers including Germany, Russia and Japan joined the 
industrialising nations, while the developing world (both colonies and non-colonies) 
remained oriented towards primary production (Gerschenkron, 1962; Maddison, 2007). This 
situation remained basically unchanged until the World War II, with the partial exceptions of 
Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. This group took the opportunity to start their own 
manufacturing development process through import substitution because of the contraction of 
world trade during the Great Depression (1930s).  
After World War II more countries began to enter the ‘catch-up phase’ thanks to the 
increasing advantages of backwardness, the greater opportunities for technology transfer and 
the industrial policies implemented by developmental states.  This allowed them to enter the 
worldwide manufacturing development race (Wade, 1990; Chang, 1994 and 2002; Amsden, 
2001 and 2007; Reinert, 2007). At a first glance, three sets of stylised facts emerge as 
characteristic features of the last half of the twentieth century.  
First, there has been a worldwide process of structural change and quantitative redistribution 
of manufacturing across countries. In 1950, when the manufacturing development process 
became a major worldwide phenomenon, manufacturing constituted around 30 per cent of 
GDP in advanced economies while in developing countries the figure was around 12 per cent 
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(see Figure 1). Among economies in the ‘catch up phase’ Latin America remained the most 
industrialised region until 1975 when the manufacturing sector started contracting to the point 
that, in 2005, the share of manufacturing in GDP had reverted to 1950s levels. The 
manufacturing development path followed by countries in Africa was on average almost flat, 
reaching its peak in 1990 and decreasing to 11 per cent (again a return to figures seen in 
1950).  
In contrast manufacturing continued to increase in many Asian economies throughout the last 
half-century with an impressive acceleration from 1965 to 1980. Finally, in the most 
advanced economies, the manufacturing share started decreasing in the late 1960s, from 30 
per cent to 18 per cent on average in less than a decade, although the absolute manufacturing 
output increases or remained stable  (Maddison 2007; Szirmai 2011). During the second half 
of the last century, few East Asian economies experienced a sustained catching up process 
responsible for the quantitative redistribution of world manufacturing value added shares and 
world manufactures trade. Inn 2010 the three most successful countries in East Asia, namely 
China, The Republic of Korea and China Taiwan Province taken as a whole accounted for 
one fifth of world manufacturing value added shares and world manufactures trade. 
 
Figure 1: Worldwide manufacturing development paths (changes in the shares of 
manufacturing in GDP at current prices per country groups over the period 1950 – 
2005) 
Source: Authors (based on Szirmai 2011’s database). 
 
The quantitative redistribution of manufacturing, from advanced economies to a number of 
fast growing countries, has also been accompanied by a qualitative transformation within 
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countries’ manufacturing sectors. At different stages of development (measured in real GDP 
per capita, US dollars 2005), a country’s manufacturing sector is composed of different 
proportions of resource-based, labour intensive and skill/capital intensive industries.  A set of 
regularities have been observed (UNIDO 2013):  
• Up to US$ 2000 a country’s manufacturing sector tends to be composed of almost 50 
per cent resource-based industries, 20 per cent labour intensive industries and 30 per 
cent skill/capital intensive industries; 
• Between US$ 2000 and US$ 8000 the ratio of labour intensive and skill/capital 
intensive industries tends to invert, while resource-based manufacturing industries are 
unchanged;  
• Finally, from US$ 8000 onwards there is a tendency for the resource-based industries to 
become less prevalent while there is an increase in skill/capital intensive industries 
(such as  machinery production, automotive or chemicals) and a strong reduction in 
labour intensive industries (such as textiles and apparel).      
 
An analysis at the sub-sectoral level confirms the existence of qualitative transformations 
within the manufacturing sector as countries increase their GDP per capita (see Figure 2). 
Now, as Lall notes, “there are many roads to heaven” (Lall, 2004:7) and the speed at which 
countries go through qualitative transformations varies over time depending on the pace of 
their respective technological changes.  However these analyses  clearly suggest that while 
different manufacturing development trajectories are possible, some of them are more likely 
to occur at certain stages of development than others (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Change in share of manufacturing sub-sectors in GDP at selected per capita 
income levels for large countries 
Source: Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2010; UNIDO 4digit Database. 
 
The third feature of the last half of the twentieth century is that the degree of variance among 
manufacturing development paths is very high even between countries within the same 
regions or income groups. For example, among the group of today’s advanced economies, we 
observe two different groups of countries. There are those such as Germany and Japan which 
have maintained a strong manufacturing base and there are those such as the US and UK who 
have increasingly relied on services (O’Sullivan et al. 2013). The manufacturing development 
trajectories followed by China and India or Brazil are also very different. 
 
1.2  The manufacturing oriented view 
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For a long time, the term industrialisation (i.e raising share of manufacturing in GDP) was 
synonymous with development, particularly amongst classical development economists such 
as Roseinstein-Rodan, Hirschman, Prebisch and Kaldor. Participation in the global 
industrialisation race was regarded as a sine qua non for countries that wished to experience 
accelerated economic growth, increasing labour productivity and socio-economic welfare 
improvements.  
During the 1960s, the historical evidence available pointed to the existence of a solid 
correlation between manufacturing development and economic growth. Classical 
development economists provided two sets of explanations for manufacturing being the 
engine of economic growth. The first one focused on the internal ‘special properties’ of 
manufacturing and the second on the way in which these ‘special properties’ spread to the 
rest of the economy triggering processes of increasing returns and economic growth2. The 
systematisation of a manufacturing oriented view was mainly due to the seminal work of 
Nicholas Kaldor and Albert Hirschman (amongst others).  
Building on the classical work on increasing returns by Allyn Young (1928) and the 
empirical regularities pointed out by Kuznets, Chenery and Syrquin, Nicholas Kaldor (1966, 
1967 and 1985) developed his three famous Growth Laws. These showed the existence of 
increasing returns within manufacturing and the reasons why manufacturing was the engine 
of aggregate growth. The first of these laws states that the faster the rate of manufacturing 
growth, the faster the rate of economic growth of the overall system. The second law (also 
known as the Verdoorn’s law) states that there is a strong positive causal relation between the 
rate of growth of manufacturing output and the rate of growth of manufacturing 
productivity3. Finally, according to the third law, aggregate productivity growth is positively 
associated with the growth of employment in manufacturing (and negatively related with the 
growth of non-manufacturing employment).  
The ‘special properties’ (implicit in the second law) that make manufacturing more effective 
in triggering growth of the overall economy than other types of economic activity (through 
the working of the first and third law) are threefold.  Firstly, there are relatively broader 
opportunities for capital accumulation and intensification in manufacturing (in comparison to 
agriculture and services). Secondly, there are greater possibilities of exploiting economies of 
scale induced by large-scale production and technical indivisibilities, both within and across 
industries.  Finally there are the higher learning opportunities in manufacturing production 
through which embodied and disembodied technological progress is generated. Given these 
special properties, specialisation in manufacturing implies a double productivity gain (it 
allows countries to get a ‘structural change bonus’ and to avoid a ‘structural change burden’). 
The former results from transferring labour from agriculture to manufacturing, the latter 
                                                            
2 The different sources of increasing returns identified in the classical line of Smith, Babbage, Young and 
Kaldor are discussed in Andreoni and Scazzieri (2013). See Toner (1999) for a review of Kaldor’s laws and 
their contributions to the Cumulative Causation Theory  
3 This law is implicit in the idea stated by A.Young (1928) that “the division of labour depends upon the extent 
of the market, but the extent of the market depends upon the division of labour”. This means that “an increase in 
the market triggers further specialisation which is a process that simultaneously increases the size of the market 
for specialist skills and activities” (Best 1999:107). 
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relates to the so-called ‘Baumol’ disease’ (an overall slowdown of productivity resulting from 
an over-dependence on services, especially labour intensive ones such as personal services) 
(Baumol 1967). 
The mechanisms through which manufacturing is able to extend its special properties to the 
rest of the economy were explicitly formulated by Albert Hirschman (1958). In his 
‘unbalanced growth model’ each sector is linked with the rest of the economic system by its 
direct and indirect intermediate purchase of productive inputs and sales of productive outputs 
– i.e. backward and forward linkages. According to its system of linkages, each sector 
exercises ‘push’ and ‘pull’ forces on the rest of the economy.  Unlike agriculture, the 
industrial sector is characterised by both strong backward and forward linkages and thus 
emerges as the main driver of development4. However, sectors are not just linked through the 
set of physical relations of supply and demand.  The embodied and disembodied knowledge 
generated within the manufacturing sector connects within and across sectors through so-
called spillover effects. The latter take the form of product and process technologies 
(hardware) on which software-producing and software-using service sectors are based (see 
Szirmai, 2011). This is why, according to Hirschman (1981:75), the development process is 
“essentially the record of how one thing leads to another” through an incremental unfolding 
of production and technological linkages stemming from manufacturing production.  
Economists embracing a manufacturing oriented view also stressed the importance of 
manufacturing in relation to other macro-economic issues. Crucially manufactured products 
have a high income elasticity of demand (as per capita income increases demand decreases 
for agricultural products and increases for manufacturing products - the so called Engel law, 
1857). This opens up dynamic opportunities for the development of manufacturing 
production. Moreover, flourishing production of manufacturing tradeables was considered a 
fundamental condition for avoiding balance of payments crises.  This was particularly the 
case where countries cannot rely on a high-value primary commodity export sector and the 
income elasticity of demand for its imports is higher than the foreign income elasticity of 
demand for its exports (Prebisch, 1949; Landesmann 1989).     
Although the validity of Kaldor’s laws was the object of much debate throughout this 
period5, the manufacturing oriented view remained extremely influential until the mid- 
1970s. However the manufacturing oriented view came under attack during the 1980s and 
was gradually abandoned in the following decade when the service oriented view became 
dominant.  
 
1.3 The service oriented view 
                                                            
4 The classical debate on agriculture vs manufacturing development is discussed in the Third Essay of this 
dissertation. 
5 Two main debates were hosted in Economica (1968) and in the Economic Journal (Rowthorn 1975). See 
Dasgupta and Singh (2005) for a recent empirical test of Kaldor’s laws. 
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The development of the service oriented view was triggered by the fact that, in both advanced 
and developing countries, the service sector appeared to be replacing manufacturing as the 
leader in the process of economic growth. Since the 1960s the most advanced economies 
have lost on average almost half of their manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP as a 
result of an accelerated process of de-industrialisation. Moreover, in the developing world, a 
set of phenomena seemed to run contrary to the historical pattern of structural change 
followed by today’s advanced countries (Palma, 2005; Dasgupta and Singh, 2005). Firstly, in 
several developing economies manufacturing employment (in both relative and absolute 
terms) started to fall early by historical standards, suggesting a form of ‘premature’ de-
industrialisation.  Secondly, the related phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’ appeared as even 
fast-growing economies, such as India, saw employment stagnation. Finally services often 
grew at a faster long-term rate than manufacturing during the 1990s (once again this was 
particularly marked in countries like India), which suggested that services can actually 
substitute for manufacturing as engines of growth. 
Theoretical explanations for the rising share of services associated with economic growth 
mainly concentrate on final expenditure patterns and prices (i.e. demand side factors). The 
basic intuition is that as people increase their income they begin to demand relatively more 
services. The falling demand for manufacturing goods thus naturally leads (so the argument 
goes) to the shrinking of the manufacturing sector6. Most fundamentally, the idea that 
productivity increases are limited in service industries came under sustained attack with the 
flourishing of modern services such as finance, engineering, distribution. The increasing 
application of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has allowed major 
productivity improvements in services and the marginal cost of providing services has 
collapsed, showing the potential for scale effects. Those supporting the service oriented view 
thus questioned the notion of ‘Baumol’s disease’.  They also emphasised the possibilities 
opened up by tradable knowledge-based services such as engineering, consulting and banking  
Countries such as Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and the United States (but also mistakenly 
Switzerland and Singapore) were offered as successful examples of the huge potential 
contribution that the service sector can have in both employment creation (high-skilled 
workers in finance, business services, education and health in particular) and in productivity 
growth (Wolfl, 2003).  
In terms of developing countries, the idea that industrialisation was no longer synonymous 
with development also took root and was epitomised by the Indian experience. It was 
suggested that developing countries now experience a historically novel pattern of structural 
change that is determined by a new technological paradigm. According to this explanation, 
services such as ICT, business support and finance are replacing or complementing 
manufacturing in a pro-growth way. Little emphasis is given to the fact that developing 
countries run the risk of premature de-industrialisation.  There is little concern that this might 
undermine their capacity to satisfy future changes in consumer demand or to 
                                                            
6 See the seminal work by Fisher (1939) and Clark (1940).  Bell (1973) is the classic work on post-industrial 
society. On income-price linkages see Kravis et. al. (1982), Bhagwati (1984a), Panagariya (1988).   And finally on 
productivity and rising prices in services see Baumol et al. (1985) 
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accumulate/build production capacities and institutions.  And of course this was precisely 
what characterised the manufacturing-led pattern of growth (see Cohen and Zysman, 1987; 
Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004)7.  
The service oriented view resulted in a new policy package which is well summarised in the 
OECD Growth in Services Report (2005). Here the following set of policies is recommended 
with the explicit aim of strengthening the potential of services to foster employment, 
productivity and innovation: 
[1] Open domestic services markets to create new job opportunities and foster innovation 
and productivity. 
[2] Take unilateral and multilateral steps to open international markets to trade and 
investment in services. 
[3] Reform labour markets to enable employment creation and adjustment to a growing 
services economy. 
[4] Adapt education and training policies to rapidly changing requirements for new skills. 
[5] Adapt innovation policies to the growing importance of services innovation. 
[6] Remove impediments that prevent services firms from seizing the benefits of ICT. 
[7] Provide a fiscal environment that is conducive to the growth of services.8 
 
Although the pro service-view remained dominant until recently, an increasing number of 
studies (see next section) have highlighted important fallacies in the service oriented view 
and the empirical evidence it offers and argued that the dichotomy between the 
manufacturing oriented and service oriented views itself is unhelpful.  
 
2. Beyond polarisation: Sources of de-industrialisation, statistical illusions and 
symbiotic interdependencies 
The first issue we must address if we are to move the debate beyond the crude industry versus 
services dichotomy is that of the sources of deindustrialisation.  We must investigate whether 
de-industrialisation (defined as a decline in the share of manufacturing employment in a 
given country) is indeed caused by the growing irrelevance of manufacturing as service 
oriented advocates suggest.  
Robert Rowthorn and co-authors (1987; 1999; 2004) have done crucial work on the rapid 
process of de-industrialisation9 experienced by most industrialised countries (in particular the 
                                                            
7 As we will argue, later developed countries may be running the same risk of losing those manufacturing 
capacities which are vital even for the development of their service sector. 
8 It is interesting to note that, in contrast, in the late 1960s, Kaldor as an economic adviser to the British 
government, proposed a selective employment tax to promote manufacturing in Britain. 
9 De-industrialisation is registered as a decline in manufacturing employment first in relative terms and then, at 
least in some countries, also in absolute terms.  
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EU and UK)10 and by many medium/high-income developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s.  They see this process as the “natural consequence of the industrial dynamism in an 
already developed economy” while “the pattern of trade specialisation among the advanced 
economies explains the differences in the structure of employment among them”.  In other 
words, the main explanation of deindustrialisation is to be found in the “systematic tendency 
of productivity in manufacturing to grow faster than in services” (Rowthorn and 
Ramaswamy, 1999: 1-7, italics added).  A recent work by Tregenna (2009: 433) confirms this 
thesis by demonstrating empirically that the decline in manufacturing employment is 
“associated primarily with falling labour intensity of manufacturing rather than an overall 
decline in the size or share of the manufacturing sector”.  
Secondly, just as the sources of deindustrialisation seem to lie more with superior 
manufacturing productivity rather than strong services performance, the statistical illusion 
issue also runs counter to the service oriented case.  The decreasing relative importance of 
manufacturing measured as a share of a given country’s total employment seems to be partly 
the result of a ‘statistical illusion’.  It occurs because a number of activities from design and 
data processing to transport, cleaning and security have been contracted out by manufacturing 
firms to specialist service providers. 
Even if we ignore the underestimation of manufacturing employment shares resulting from 
the ‘splintering effect’ (Bhagwati’s 1984b), the reality is that many OECD countries have in 
fact experienced a steady (rather than drastic) decline in the share of manufacturing in total 
employment (for the period 1970- 2004, see Figure 6). Thus, in contrast with what the service 
oriented view, deindustrialisation has not been a sudden process occurring with declines in 
manufacturing output, productivity and demand.  Rather, employment losses have involved 
different industries and countries in different ways (with no exception for high tech 
manufacturing) (Pilat et al 2006). In the very period when deindustrialisation began (1970- 
2004), manufacturing production and value added in fact continued to experience strong 
growth and demand for manufacturing goods was sustained.  Most tellingly, productivity 
growth in manufacturing remained high in many OECD countries while deindustrialisation 
was occurring and there is evidence that the manufacturing sector continued driving the 
process of innovation and technological change. Although the growing investment in 
innovative services and the outsourcing of R&D to specialised labs (counted as ‘services’) 
have reduced business investment in manufacturing R&D, the latter sector still accounts for 
the bulk of spending on technological innovation and development. The recent analysis of the 
structural evolution of the United States economy provided in Spence and Hlatshwayo (2011) 
confirms these general trends in mature industrial economies.   
 
                                                            
10 Most industrialised countries reached this phase of de-industrialisation around the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s, while some high-income DCs (such as the rapidly industrialising countries of East Asia) 
began this phase in the 1980s. The empirical analysis in Palma (2005) confirms the ‘inverted- U’-type of 
trajectory of manufacturing employment with respect to income per capita.  
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Given the statistical illusions discussed above (the result of a blurring of the traditional 
distinction between services and manufacturing), measuring intersectoral interactions is 
extremely complex (Pilat and Wolfl, 2005)11. The bundle of interactions that connects 
manufacturing and services is becoming increasingly dense, given the outsourcing of services 
activities from manufacturing firms to service providers but also the changing technological 
linkages between manufacturing and services (in particular production-related services). The 
existence of strong intersectoral interactions and interdependencies between manufacturing 
and services is something that was originally revealed by input-output analyses performed by 
Park (1989), Park and Chan (1989) and Park (1994)12.  
It is increasingly apparent that the ‘symbiotic’ interdependencies between manufacturing and 
service leads to the consideration of a fundamental question, to what extent and in which 
direct and indirect ways does manufacturing contribute to the development of services (and 
vice versa)? The influential work by Se-Hark Park and Kenneth Chan addressed this issue by 
examining separately the linkages existing between disaggregated groups of services and 
various manufacturing industries13. Their analysis was based on the classification proposed 
by Gershuny and Miles (1983) which divides service activities into two major groups: 
marketed services and non-marketed services, and then breaks these down into further sub-
categories including the sub-category of producer services which, in turn, is constituted by 
specialised technical services which support production processes. 
Park and Chan’s empirical analysis conducted on 26 countries selected in the UNIDO 
database confirmed Hirschman’s intuition that the manufacturing sector has larger multiplier 
effects than do services.  Specifically, it tends to generate a two to three- fold greater output 
impact on the economy because of the denser backward and forward linkages formed within 
and around it14. Moreover, their data showed the ‘catalytic role’ that industry could play in 
fostering employment opportunities in the services sector (the indirect employment effect). 
                                                            
11 Building on the work of Alfred Chandler, the historical analysis developed by Schmenner (2008) has shown 
how servitisation has antecedents that go back 150 years. At that time the bundling of manufactured goods to 
downstream services was a business strategy adopted by companies which lacked manufacturing strength in 
order to establish barriers to entry for potential competitors. 
12 Interestingly Damesick (1986)’s analysis of Britain transformation during the 1970s and early 1980s stressed 
the idea of a symbiotic relationship between manufacturing and services development (the same intuition has 
been empirically tested by Park, 1989). 
13 Empirical studies in regional income and employment multiplier analysis (Stewart and Streeten 1971) had 
previously shown using input-output techniques that the “the direct employment effect of industrial investment 
is small relative to its indirect effects resulting from the interindustry purchases of inputs and income induced 
effects of private consumption”.  Moreover “as the industrial base broadens and becomes more integrated, both 
horizontally and vertically, the employment impact of industrial activities should also increase substantially” 
(Park and Chan, 1989: 201). This scenario is consistent with the ‘macro-economic’ effects observed by A. A. 
Young (1928) and later discussed in Kaldor (see above). 
14 The input-output analysis conducted by Pilat and Wolfl, 2005 reached the same conclusion stating that 
“Manufacturing industries interact much more strongly with other industries, both as providers and as users of 
intermediate inputs. Even though services now contribute as providers of intermediate input to the performance 
of other industries, their role remains more limited than that of the manufacturing sector”. 
13 
 
This study explicitly stressed that “the evolution of the intersectoral relationship between 
services and manufacturing in the course of development is symbiotic, in the sense that the 
growth of the service sector depends not only on that of the manufacturing sector, but also 
structural change of the former is bound to affect that of the latter” (Park and Chan, 1989: 
212). Precisely these results have been recently confirmed by Guerrieri and Meliciani (2005). 
Their analysis has shown that a country’s capacity to develop its services sector depends on 
the specific structural/technological composition of its manufacturing sector. This is because 
different manufacturing industries require different producer services and tend to use them 
with different degrees of intensity. Their analysis also highlights how the cumulative 
expansion of services can follow both inter- and intra- sectoral patterns as the same service 
producers are also intensive users of these producer services.  
Now the above mentioned studies addressed some of the misperceptions that lay behind the 
service oriented view and qualified and refined many of the intuitions supporting the original 
manufacturing oriented arguments.  However, the real turning point in the ‘making versus 
doing’ debate was triggered by the massive acceleration in the transformations of the world 
manufacturing landscape resulting from the financial crisis. 
 
3. The Manufacturing Loss15 
The financial crisis that started in late 2007 in US had a massive impact on world industrial 
production, both on the total output and on the output distribution between mature industrial 
economies and developing countries. Focusing on the crisis period 2008-2009, we can 
estimate the ‘manufacturing loss’ by comparing three different scenarios (all estimates are 
given at constant 2000 US$):  
- the first scenario is the actual world manufacturing value added (World MVA R) 
during the crisis period 2008-2009;  
- the second one is a zero growth estimate of world manufacturing value added (World 
MVA ZGR) for the crisis period 2008-2009;  
- the third one is a sustained growth estimate of world manufacturing value added 
based on the average annual growth rate achieved in the pre-crisis period between 
2000 and 2007 (World MVA SGR).  
The manufacturing loss estimate reveals the collapse of industrial production worldwide with 
respect to both the zero and the sustained growth rate scenarios (see Figure 3). Specifically 
world manufacturing loss was US$ 361.32 billion (with respect to the zero growth rate 
scenario) and US$ 875.72 billion (if we compare it with the sustained growth rate scenario).  
This later figures comes to more than 1 US$ trillion at current prices.  
 
 
 
                                                            
15 This section mainly draws on Andreoni and Uphadaya, 2013 (forthcoming). 
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Figure 3: Real, Zero and Sustained Growth of MVA 
Source: Andreoni and Uphadaya, 2013; UNIDO MVA database 2011. 
 
Now the industrialised countries in North America, Europe and Asia witnessed a severe 
manufacturing loss calculated to be US$ 671.01 billion (with respect to the zero growth rate 
scenario) and US$ 814.58 billion (with respect to the sustained growth rate scenario).  
However, in contrast, the manufacturing value added (MVA) in developing countries 
continued growing at least with respect to the zero growth rate scenario so there was a total 
manufacturing gain of 309.68 billion US$. In the sustained growth estimate scenario, the 
manufacturing loss in developing countries was seven times more contained than that of 
industrialised economies (equal to US$).125.17 billion  
These results are not totally surprising if we look at these data in the context of the long term 
manufacturing trajectories discussed above (see section 2.1). Since 1995 developing 
countries’ contribution to world MVA increased 13 percentage points (going from 20%to 33 
%), according to UNIDO statistics.  In other words, MVA has multiplied by 2.25 times. 
Among the developing countries, China and India drove the expansionary process, with the 
former becoming the world’s second largest industrial power and the latter entering the top 
ten of world manufacturing producers for the first time.  
In contrast, in the case of the mature industrialised economies, the analysis seems to suggest 
that the financial crisis introduced a structural break in the data (although it is difficult to 
isolate the impact of long-term trends from the manufacturing loss experienced in the 2008-
2009 period). This means that the process of sectoral re-composition that mature 
industrialised economies have been experiencing since the 1970s accelerated as a result of the 
financial crisis. The speed at which mature industrialised economies (in particular US and 
countries in the Euro area) have been losing manufacturing shares in GDP is remarkable.  A 
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good way to visualise this is to look once again at the increasing relative contraction of 
manufacturing in favour of service sectors such as finance, real estate and business services.  
After the crisis period 2008-2009, countries’ performances continued to be extremely 
differentiated. During the period 2007 – 2012, traditional industrialised countries registered 
on average a significant shrinking of their manufacturing base (as measured by the 
fundamental industrial diagnostic, MVA per capita). The Republic of Korea is the only 
country among the industrialised nations that increased its MVA performance.  In contrast, 
amongst developing countries, China and India witnessed an overall expansion of their 
manufacturing base.  This is shown in Table 1 for a sample of countries including the top 
thirty performers in terms of share in world manufacturing value added and world 
manufactured exports for the period 2007-2012. As a result of these dynamics, the 
distribution of total MVA is even more concentrated if we considered that the top twenty 
performers in the world produce almost 90% of world total MVA (see Figure 4). 
It is this dramatic acceleration in the de-industrialisation process experienced in 
developed countries as a result of the financial crisis that has led to an increasing questioning 
of the service oriented ‘conventional wisdom’16.  The crisis situation has led many analysts to 
ask: ‘Has off-shoring gone too far?’ and, more importantly, ‘Does manufacturing still matter 
for the wealth of advanced nations?’  
 
Figure 4: Concentration of manufacturing value added, top twenty countries (2012) 
 
Source: Authors (based on UNIDO Statistics, 2013) 
 
                                                            
16 For a comparison between the crisis rates and the pre-crisis rate of de-industrialisation see Andreoni 2013.  
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Table 1: Winners and losers in a time of global financial crisis, 2007 – 2012 
Ranking 
2012 by 
totMVA 
Country MVA 
 var % 
MVApc var 
% 
GDP  
var % 
GDPpc  
var % 
MVAsh 
var 
WMVAsh 
var 
WGDPsh 
var 
1 United States of America -1.41% -5.63% 3.01% -1.40% -0.61% -1.56% -1.19% 
2 China 60.45% 56.64% 55.63% 51.94% 1.03% 5.90% 2.60% 
3 Japan -7.64% -7.58% -2.31% -2.25% -1.21% -1.62% -0.91% 
4 Germany -8.57% -7.99% 3.48% 4.14% -2.49% -1.04% -0.24% 
5 Republic of Korea 25.22% 22.42% 15.94% 13.34% 2.07% 0.52% 0.14% 
6 France -6.56% -9.08% 0.42% -2.29% -0.80% -0.37% -0.31% 
7 Italy -23.98% -25.81% -7.03% -9.27% -3.09% -1.05% -0.51% 
8 United Kingdom -14.75% -17.33% -3.40% -6.33% -1.33% -0.64% -0.51% 
9 India 38.46% 29.17% 38.01% 28.76% 0.05% 0.54% 0.57% 
10 Mexico 6.47% 0.12% 8.28% 1.82% -0.30% 0.01% 0.01% 
11 Brazil 3.83% -0.66% 17.51% 12.44% -1.75% -0.04% 0.18% 
12 Russian Federation -1.56% -1.15% 9.48% 9.94% -1.54% -0.12% 0.03% 
13 Canada -13.60% -17.83% 5.48% 0.32% -2.33% -0.34% -0.05% 
14 Spain -20.82% -24.49% -4.13% -8.57% -2.35% -0.50% -0.27% 
15 Turkey 19.60% 12.35% 16.67% 9.60% 0.44% 0.14% 0.09% 
16 China, Taiwan Province 6.96% 5.30% 11.14% 9.42% -0.99% 0.01% 0.02% 
17 Indonesia 26.73% 20.36% 32.97% 26.29% -1.26% 0.20% 0.15% 
18 Poland 37.37% 36.91% 18.54% 18.15% 3.00% 0.23% 0.07% 
19 Australia 4.44% -3.76% 12.20% 3.39% -0.68% -0.01% 0.07% 
20 Thailand 20.48% 16.87% 13.99% 10.57% 2.01% 0.11% 0.02% 
21 Netherlands -6.65% -8.17% 0.49% -1.14% -0.92% -0.13% -0.09% 
22 Switzerland 3.71% 0.87% 5.77% 2.87% -0.37% -0.02% -0.02% 
23 Sweden -0.52% -4.02% 4.67% 0.99% -0.89% -0.05% -0.02% 
24 Austria -2.13% -3.51% 3.43% 1.97% -1.03% -0.06% -0.03% 
25 Argentina 24.89% 19.57% 31.26% 25.67% -1.04% 0.10% 0.09% 
26 Belgium -7.17% -9.32% 2.14% -0.22% -1.39% -0.09% -0.04% 
27 Ireland 21.30% 13.67% -8.54% -14.29% 6.44% 0.08% -0.07% 
28 Malaysia 12.33% 3.63% 21.24% 11.85% -2.12% 0.03% 0.04% 
29 Singapore 23.33% 7.59% 23.74% 7.94% -0.08% 0.07% 0.04% 
30 South Africa 1.49% -2.30% 11.06% 6.91% -1.43% -0.02% 0.02% 
 
 World <YB 2013> 6.09% 0.24% 7.84% 1.90% -0.28% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Industrialized Economies -4.99% -7.75% 1.89% -1.06% -1.08% -7.58% -4.24% 
 Developing & EIE 35.45% 27.24% 27.62% 19.88% 1.24% 7.58% 4.24% 
 
Source: Authors (based on UNIDO Statistics, 2013) 
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4. Why and how does Manufacturing still matter: Old rationales, New realities 
Since the 2009 crisis there has been a proliferation of policy reports, academic contributions, 
manufacturing national strategies and white papers in all major industrialised economies, 
investigating if manufacturing still matters17. After having lost 41% of its manufacturing jobs 
in thirty years, the US is today among the most active players in shaping a new 
manufacturing oriented view. This is rooted in the following arguments:   
(i) Manufacturing is a crucial source of high quality employment (in US, during the 
period 2008-2010, it was estimated that earnings in manufacturing are some 20% 
higher than earnings in non-manufacturing industries - see Helper at al. 2012).  
(ii) Producing tradable manufactured goods is essential to maintain the trade balance, 
given that around two-thirds of world trade is still in manufactured goods 
(according to UN Comtrade, the figure was 83.4% in 1996, while in 2009 it was 
77.4%, of which 38% were medium tech products). 
(iii) Manufacturing is the main engine of economic growth, thanks to its higher 
productivity and scope for innovation. 
 
Many of the rationales put forward seem like ‘old wine in new bottles’, although they are 
often supported by new empirical evidence. For example Rodrik (2009) found that, since 
1960, developing countries economic growth’ is strongly associated with the development of 
modern industrial sectors (both manufacturing industries and agribusiness). Another recent 
empirical analysis confirmed the ‘engine of growth hypothesis’ for a sample of 90 countries 
(21 advanced economies and 69 developing countries) in the period 1950-2005 (Szirmai and 
Verspagen, 2010).  This study found that the share of manufacturing is positively related to 
economic growth from 1950 to 2005 (in particular for poorer countries), while services have 
a significant positive effect only until 1990 and with coefficients far lower than those of 
manufacturing. Interestingly in the period 1990-2005 the coefficient for services becomes 
insignificant. 
Old rationales and new evidence are not fully satisfactory however in addressing the ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ parts of the ‘does manufacturing still matter?’ question. First, without 
disaggregating the analysis from the country level to the sub-sectors and even production 
activities/tasks levels, it is difficult to say whether certain manufacturing industries matter 
more than others (still less why and how). Secondly, without taking into account the new 
manufacturing production activities, we are not able to identify the fundamental channels 
through which certain manufacturing industries perform their ‘catalytic role’ (the expression 
is from the input-output analysis of manufacturing-services linkages by Park and Chan, 
1989). In this respect, increasing doubt has been cast on the claim that the ‘physical’ 
intersectoral linkages are still the main vectors through which manufacturing pulls overall 
economic development forward.  Thus we explore the kind of linkages that make 
manufacturing central for economic dynamism. 
                                                            
17 See among the others: Tassey, 2010; Pisano and Shy, 2009 and 2012; Ettlinger and Gordon, 2011; Ezell and 
Atkinson, 2011; Helper, et al. 2012; Bianchi and Labory 2011. 
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The following two sections address the reasons why certain manufacturing industries are 
more important than others and why technological linkages stemming from manufacturing 
industries are key enablers of a country’ systemic capacity to generate technological change. 
First, we argue that the development of a new manufacturing oriented view should focus on 
the crucial role played by certain ‘mother industries’ (as the machine tool industries are 
called).  In the second section, we investigate the systemic technological linkages which 
affect the scope for innovation of the overall economic system. This second issue is going to 
be addressed by analysing the negative consequences of de-linking manufacturing production 
from services (off-shoring) which systematically disrupt the bundle of technological linkages 
constituting the industrial commons.  
 
4.1 The manufacturing engine: ‘The production of machines by means of machines’  
The machine tool industry is a sub-sector of the mechanical engineering industry. Machine 
tools are known as ‘mother machines’ because they enable the production of other machines 
and equipment (within the broader mechanical engineering industry), including themselves. 
There are various reasons why machine tool industries are at the very core of the 
manufacturing engine (Fransman 1986). Firstly, machinery producers have a unique capacity 
of ‘self-reproducing themselves’ that is, the capacity of manufacturing their own machines 
(CECIMO, 2011). Secondly, the fact that machine tools critically enable cost reductions, 
quality improvements and productivity increases, and reduction in set-up production times. 
Thirdly, machine tools have a wide range of applications in major industries (such as 
mechanical engineering and construction, computers, automotive and aerospace, wind 
turbines and satellite and all manufacturing processes involving metals).  
The relevance of these characteristics was documented by Nathan Rosenberg (1963) in his 
historical analysis of the machine tools industry.  His very comprehensive study began with 
the emergence of the first specialised producers of machine tools (from 1840 to 1910.  By 
1910, 82.4% per cent of the world production of machine tools was concentrated in three 
countries: the US (50%), Germany (20.6%) and the United Kingdom (11.8%)18. The 
historical account provided by Rosenberg provides crucial evidence demonstrating why and 
how countries’ manufacturing development trajectories were driven mainly by their machine 
tools industry. Among the multiple ways through which machine tool industries introduced 
and spread technical change, Rosenberg (1963:416) identified three key mechanisms.    
Firstly, what he calls the ‘external adaptation’ principle.  According to this principle “all 
innovations – whether they include the introduction of a new product or provide a cheaper 
way of producing an existing product – require that the capital goods sector shall in turn 
                                                            
18 In 1925 the same three countries still dominated the 84.3% of world machinery production. These data are 
taken from Dr Karl Lange memorandum presented in May 1927 at the League of Nations International 
Economic Conference. As stressed in the journal Mechanical Engineering (1928:285) Lange’s work is “the first 
analysis of the machinery industry of the world that has been published”. After the World War II, the situation 
remained almost unchanged, although the USSR entered the machine tool industry global race reaching 10% of 
world production (Rynn, 2010). 
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produce a new product (capital good) according to certain specification” (1963:416). Indeed, 
machine tools producers are requested to continuously customise their production and 
develop innovative solutions for more efficient production systems, often joining forces with 
their customers in the consumer goods or other capital goods industries. In doing so, machine 
tools producers operate as ‘innovation bridges’.  In other words, they transfer production 
expertise and transform the way in which goods are produced and services are delivered. 
Secondly, the ‘internal adaptation’ principle, refers to the unique possibility for machinery 
producers to improve and change the characteristics/specifications/standards of the capital 
goods they produce by improving and changing the machines used for the production of the 
capital goods themselves. Cost-reduction in the machine tool industry triggers a cumulative 
process through which investment activities in other industries are boosted, the speed at 
which technological innovations are installed and spread increases, and the marginal 
efficiency of capital of other industries rises. Finally, for the economy as whole, cost 
reductions in the machine tools industry is a form of capital saving.  
The third principle is that of ‘external economy’.   According to Rosenberg, the “high degree 
of specialisation [in machinery production] is conducive not only to an effective learning 
process but to an effective application of that which is learned. This highly developed facility 
in the designing and production of specialised machinery is, perhaps, the most important 
single characteristic of a well-developed capital goods industry and constitutes an external 
economy of enormous importance to other sectors of the economy” (Rosenberg, 1963:425; 
see also Andreoni, 2013). 
The machine tool industry underwent profound transformations through the twentieth 
century. Initially, the introduction of numerical control (NC) machine tools improved 
flexibility, allowed automation and reduced costs. Later increasingly refined computerised 
numerical control (CNC) machines, as well as computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-
aided manufacturing (CAM) offered efficiency gains in material consumption, shortened the 
period between the design and the production process, and allowed the increasing control of 
complex production systems (Mazzoleni, 1997; Arnold 2001). Despite these changes, the 
three mechanisms identified by Rosenberg as making the machine tool industry ‘special’ still 
stand and indeed their scope is broadened. The machine tool industry increasingly enables the 
working of complex production systems in which the traditional manufacturing tasks are 
intertwined with service activities and new technologies. This has been widely documented in 
technical reports produced by the European network of machine tools producers19.   
These reports explain how machine tools “enable to transfer the latest technological 
developments in information and communication technologies or material sciences into 
production systems, which allow to increase the efficiency of the production process and to 
machine new materials which are used later in new fields of application” (CECIMO 2011:12; 
                                                            
19 CECIMO was founded in 1950 and currently covers almost the entire metalworking machine tool production 
industry in Europe and a third of worldwide firms. It has as members approximately 1500 companies (over 80% 
of these are SMEs) with a total number of 150.000 employed people. The turnover in 2011 was approximately 
21 billion euros and ¾ of the production was shipped outside CECIMO region (the latter including EU, EFTA 
and Turkey). 
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see also the Thematic Report on Key Enabling Technologies produced by the Working Team 
on Advanced Manufacturing Systems, 2010). The machine tools industry also facilitates the 
accumulation of engineering expertise that cannot be easily copied/reproduced by 
competitors.  This guarantees a certain competitive advantage to producers in international 
markets and a ‘first mover’ advantage in the development of future products and processes. 
As a result of these unique characteristics much evidence can be found, throughout the last 
century, in support of the claim that those countries that saw their machine tools sector go 
into decline found they had an increasingly reduced capacity to make goods.  By the same 
token these same countries which saw falls in manufacturing output were also those where 
the remaining manufacturing output became increasingly dependent on the import of 
‘machines for making goods’.  Among the major industrial economies those countries which 
underwent a profound process of de-industrialisation in the second half of the last century 
were also those who lost the higher shares in world machine tool production. The United 
States went from 26.6 per cent in 1980 to 11.7 per cent of world machine tool production in 
1995 (the United Kingdom lost its major role before the 1980s, and in 1995 accounted for 
less than 3 per cent of world production).  In contrast Japan and Germany followed the 
opposite trend during the same period, going from 14.3 to 23.5% and from 17.6 to 22.6% 
respectively (Rynn, 2010).  
In 2010 one-third of world machine tool production was concentrated in China and another 
third in the Euro area (the three major producers are Germany with 43.5%, Italy with 23% 
and Switzerland with 11%, of total European, CECIMO database).  Meanwhile Japan still 
controls 14%, followed by the Republic of Korea with 7% and Taiwan with 6%.  As of 2010 
the United States accounted for only 4% of global production. A full 66% of the machine 
tools produced in 2010 were consumed in Asia, 21% in Europe and 13% in America. In 2011 
China alone accounted for 45% of world machine tool consumption.  It was followed by three 
major net exporters (Japan, Germany and Italy which consumed 9, 8 and 4 percent 
respectively) and one major importer, the United States, with an 8% share in world machine 
tool consumption (Oxford Economics, 2012). According to the CECIMO forecast, machine 
tool consumption will continue shifting to Asia which will reach 70% of world total in 2015, 
confirming Asia as the major consumer and producer of machine tools.  
 
4.2 Breaking technological linkages in the manufacturing value chain: Losing 
industrial commons and technological lock-in 
Modern definitions of manufacturing increasingly recognise the ‘value chain’ of activities 
from R&D to after-sales service (see Figure 5) This value chain representation highlights 
potential interdependencies between the stages. Whilst varying significantly between sectors 
and technologies these interdependencies can dramatically influence companies and indeed 
countries opportunities to capture value from their innovations, capabilities and market 
opportunities. Loss of production capability for example, may make it impossible to realise a 
new product concept while poop understanding of production and supply may mean that new 
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product designs are infeasible. Indeed product innovations themselves may be inhibited by 
the loss of opportunity to iterate product and process synergies. 
 
Figure 5: The Manufacturing value chain 
 
 
 
Source: Authors (adapted from NIST, 2013:8) 
 
After two decades (from the 1980s to the late 1990s)20 in which the farming out/abroad of in-
house operations occurred with almost religious fervour, more recent attitudes have been 
cautious and even fearful of their consequences. The dominant view implied that “by 
shedding assets, companies can be born again as product designers, solutions providers, 
industry innovators, or supply chain integrators”.  They can thus “dump operational 
headaches and bottlenecks downstream, often capture immediate cost savings, and avoid 
labour conflicts and management deficiencies” (Doig et al. 2001, p. 24). However, in many 
industries such as automotives, electronics and software, it has been observed that companies 
                                                            
20 According to The 1999 Outsourcing Trends Report, the outsourcing of operations and facilities across 
industries rose by 18 percent only in the period from 1999 to 2000. 
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which outsourcing too much run the risk of ceding and, sometimes, even destroying those 
capabilities and processes that have constituted their competitive advantages. Moreover, 
outsourcing companies fail to capture the innovation opportunities that reside in the spaces of 
interaction and interfaces between manufacturing production and production related services 
(Quinn and Hilmer, 1995). In sum, there is considerable evidence that many companies have 
overestimated the advantages of outsourcing and offshoring and underestimated problems, 
such as dealing with inventory, obsolescence, organisational traumas, reaching quality 
standards and maintaining in- house technological capabilities (Ritter and Sternfels, 2004).  
The relocation of manufacturing firms and/or service providers to other countries triggers two 
simultaneous processes which affect outsourcers’ production and technological structures. 
First, countries relocating the major part of their manufacturing activities tend to experience a 
process of industrial commons deterioration, increasing relocation of production related 
services and technological lock-in. Second, in contrast, those countries in which production is 
relocated experience an expansion of the manufacturing sector and an increasing co-location 
of other manufacturing firms (as well as production related services providers). The 
transformation in the US software industry demonstrates this point well.  In order to lower 
software development costs US companies initially started outsourcing mundane code-
writing projects to Indian firms21. However Indian companies soon developed their 
technological capabilities in software engineering because of the experience provided by the 
routine work they had been given.  Thus India became increasingly able to attract more 
complex manufacturing and services activities to India such as developing architectural 
specifications and writing sophisticated firmware and device drivers (Pisano and Shih, 2009 
and 2012; Tassey, 2010).  
The opposite trend, namely loss of technological capabilities has been observed in US 
software companies. Of course a similar process may be triggered by off-shoring services 
providers as well as manufacturing firms. However, given the multiplier effects which 
characterise the expansion of the manufacturing base and the fact that certain services 
(especially production-related services) have to remain near production sites, it seems that 
off-shoring manufacturing activities is strategically more damaging than losing service-
providers.  
These cumulative processes of relocation and co-location are responsible for the 
transformation of the productive and technological structures of countries and for the present 
and future prospects of innovation and specialisation of private companies. For example, as a 
result of outsourcing, the U.S. industrial structure is no longer able to manufacture many of 
the cutting-edge products it invented. As has been widely documented “[a]mong these are 
                                                            
21 Apple is a well-known exception. Although it has outsourced the manufacture of its notebooks, iPod, and 
iPhone, Apple has preserved in-house technological capabilities by remaining involved in key phases of the 
production process.  It still plays the major role in the selection of components, industrial design, software 
development as well as direct interaction with users (i.e. ‘learning by using’).  
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such critical components as light-emitting diodes for the next generation of energy-efficient 
illumination; advanced displays for mobile phones and new consumer electronics products 
like Amazon’s Kindle e-reader”.  They also include “the batteries that power electric and 
hybrid cars; flat-panel displays for TVs, computers, and handheld devices; and many of the 
carbon-fibre components for Boeing’s new 787 Dreamliner” (Pisano and Shih, 2009:116).  
In contrast there is mounting evidence that countries acquiring manufacturing production and 
developing production-related services are accumulating technological capabilities and 
increasingly benefitting from the relocation and co-location of companies at all stages of 
global value chains. By 2010, Fortune 500 companies have 98 R&D centres in China and 63 
in India.  Surprisingly, IBM employs more people in the developing world than in America 
while in 2008, the Chinese telecom giant Huawei applied for more international patents than 
any other firm in the world (Cataneo et al. 2010).  In fact by some estimates as much as 90% 
of electronics research and development now takes place in Asia (McCormack, 2009).  
Pisano and Shih (2009) have done important research on the semiconductor, electronics, 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries.  This has revealed how the production and innovation 
capacities of a given economic system depend on the presence of multiple resources such as 
R&D know-how, engineering skills, technological capabilities, and specific manufacturing 
and prototyping competences. Many of these resources are embedded in a large number of 
manufacturing and services companies as well as other organisations, typically universities 
and vocational schools. The co-location of these actors means that the same companies and 
institutions can have access to their resources.  This is the root of the industrial commons 
phenomenon22. As in almost all high-tech industries, product and process innovations are 
strongly intertwined. The fact that manufacturing firms can undertake daily interactions with 
other manufacturers and the providers of production related-services locally constitutes a 
source of competitive advantage which benefits all actors involved (i.e. industrial 
commons)23. It is important to stress that even the development of high-tech cutting-edge 
products often depend (amongst other factors) on the commons of a mature manufacturing 
industry. The deterioration of the industrial commons caused by outsourcing can, in the long-
run, affect the ability of a given economic system to introduce new products.  This is because 
the suppliers, skills and services required to set up a new enterprise are no longer available 
locally. In contrast, countries in which manufacturing and services activities co-locate will 
experience processes of industrial commons development and benefit from innovation 
opportunities arising at the manufacturing-services interfaces.  
The second dynamic related to the de-linking of manufacturing and services in global value 
chains is that of technological lock-in. This refers to macro-level forces that create systematic 
barriers to the diffusion and adoption of efficient technologies (Arthur, 1989). One of the 
major factors associated with technological lock-in is the idea of increasing returns to 
                                                            
22 The idea of industrial commons is rooted in the classical work on industrial districts (Marshall, 1920) and the 
work by Michael Best in Greater Boston.  
23 Coffey and Bailly (1991, p.109) emphasise the role of co-location stressing how “it is the cost of maintaining 
face-to-face contacts between the producer on the one hand, and their inputs and markets, on the other 
hand, that is potentially the most expensive element of intermediate-demand service production”. 
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adoption. Early adoption of a technological solution might give it enough edge to secure its 
dominance in the market. Even if an improved technology (e.g. more environmentally 
efficient) is developed, such increasing returns may keep them locked-out of the market (i.e. 
it doesn’t pay off to change production). These technological lock-in dynamics explain the 
continued dominance of the QWERTY keyboard over the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard 
(David, 1985), and the VHS video cassette recorder standard over Betamax (Arthur, 1994). 
Recent work has shown that manufacturing offshoring can lead to technological lock-in 
effects. Fuchs and Kirchain (2010) explain that, as production in the optoelectronics industry 
has been outsourced to East Asia, the manufacture of better-performing designs developed in 
the US no longer pay off. “Production characteristics are different abroad, and the prevailing 
design can be more cost-effective in developing country production environments” (Fuchs & 
Kirchain, 2010). Thus they conclude that offshoring reduces incentives to innovation and can 
therefore lead to an erosion of technological competitiveness. 
The potential consequences of technological lock-in have been increasingly attracting 
attention among academics and policymakers. Their concern not only focuses on the potential 
adverse consequences of the loss of production capacity within advanced countries, but also 
on the potential loss of technology dynamisms and competitiveness in global industrial 
systems as a whole. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper has provided a critical review of the main turning points in the manufacturing 
versus services debate and has evaluated the broad theoretical, empirical and policy 
landscape within which the manufacturing renaissance is appearing. The review of the 
manufacturing oriented versus service oriented debate showed how, over the latter part of the 
XX century, the polarisation of the debate seriously undervalued the role of manufacturing 
development. As a result of the financial crisis and the massive manufacturing loss 
experienced by developed economies many have started to question “Why and how does 
manufacturing still matters?”.  
 
The paper argued that the answer to this question cannot be found in conventional 
macroeconomic or sector level analyses, instead it is necessary to look at the sub-sectors and 
even production activities/tasks levels, taking into account the new realities of manufacturing 
systems and their configuration in global production networks. The paper has shown the 
extent to which this change of perspective becomes essential if we want to understand why 
certain manufacturing industries are more important than others and why technological 
linkages stemming from manufacturing industries are key enablers of a country’s systemic 
capacity to generate technological change.  
 
Production equipment industries, exemplified in our paper by the analysis of the machine tool 
industry, serve to enhance and support wider production capability and capacity development 
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harnessing and embodying key technological linkages. Finally, the importance of such 
technological linkages has been discussed in the new context of global manufacturing value 
chains and companies’ offshoring. The paper documented how offshoring might run the risk 
of breaking key innovation chains leading to technological lock-in, or perhaps better lock-out 
as countries lose the incentive and capability to develop and introduce new innovations and 
indeed products.  
 
The set of manufacturing realities and dynamics analysed in the paper constitutes a starting 
point towards a new manufacturing oriented view of economic systems as well as it has 
profound implications for the design and governance of manufacturing policies in advanced 
economies.  
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